Autopsy Reports,  Testimonial  or  Non-Testimonial ? by Scarfone, Matthew C.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Student Scholarship
1-1-2010
Autopsy Reports, "Testimonial" or "Non-
Testimonial"?
Matthew C. Scarfone
Michigan State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew C. Scarfone, Autopsy Reports, "Testimonial" or "Non-Testimonial"? (2010),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king/157
 AUTOPSY REPORTS, “TESTIMONIAL” OR “NON-TESTIMONIAL”? 


















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
King Scholar Program 
Michigan State University College of Law 
under the direction of 






HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE  
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him[.]”1  The Supreme Court explained that, “Confrontation Clause cases fall into two broad 
categories: cases involving the admission of out-of-court statements and cases involving 
restrictions imposed by law or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination.”2 In the 
context of cases involving out-of-court statements, there are situations in which the declarant is 
unavailable to provide live in-court testimony or be cross-examined.    If within an exception to 
the hearsay rule, an out-of-court statement may be admitted in lieu of a declarant’s in-court 
testimony; however, under the Confrontation Clause, the accused has a right to cross-examine 
any witness against him. Thus, an out-of-court statement may be admissible according to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence standing alone, but its admission, without allowing the accused the 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, would arguably violate the Confrontation Clause.  In 
such circumstances, an inherent conflict arises between the admission of hearsay under the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause.   
A. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PRE-CRAWFORD 
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court used a balancing test to approach such a situation, 
stating that “competing interests, if ‘closely examined,’ . . . may warrant dispensing with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
2 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985).   
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confrontation at trial.”3  The Court identified “a strong interest in effective law enforcement, and 
in the development and precise formulation of the rules of evidence applicable in criminal 
proceedings.”  The Court held that evidence falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception was 
admissible and did not violate the Confrontation Clause.4  The Roberts court went on to say that 
evidence that doesn’t fit into a “firmly rooted” exception, but that has “particularized guarantees 
of trustworthiness,” as is required by Rule 807’s residual exception, would also be admissible 
and would not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.5  Thus, Roberts in effect 
held that any evidence that complies with the requirements of any hearsay exception, whether it 
is “firmly rooted” or has “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” within Rule 807’s 
residual exception, is admissible and its admission without an opportunity for cross-examination 
does not violate the Confrontation Clause.6   
B. CRAWFORD AND THE “TESTIMONIAL” VS. “NON-TESTIMONIAL” DISTINCTION 
In 2004, the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington.7  In Crawford, the 
petitioner argued, and the Court ultimately agreed, that the test from Roberts, which required 
only that the evidence fit within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bear particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness, “stray[ed] from the original meaning of the Confrontation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980). 
4 Id. at 66.  
5 Id. at 66.  
6 30B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 7032 (1st ed.) (“If it was good enough for the Federal Rules of Evidence, it was 
good enough for the confrontation clause.”) 
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  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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Clause.”8  Engaging in a historical analysis of the Confrontation Clause, the Court concluded that 
the history supports two inferences. The first of these inferences was that, “the principal evil at 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and 
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”9  Secondly, “that 
the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did 
not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”10 
“First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law 
mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against 
the accused.”11  Based upon this first inference, the Court rejected the idea that the Confrontation 
Clause’s application to out-of-court statements hinges on modern rules of evidence, stating that, 
“[l]eaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the 
Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.”12  The 
Court explained that the Sixth Amendment was primarily aimed at “testimonial” hearsay,13  and 
that the Confrontation Clause “applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused – in other words, those 
who ‘bear testimony.’”14  The Court clarified, without specifically defining the term, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Id. at 42. 
9 Id. at 50. 
10 Id. at 55-56.  
11 Id. at 50. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 53 (“In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its 
primary object.”) 
14 Id. at 51.  
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“testimonial” evidence may include, (1) “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent,” included in this category are “material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, 
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements 
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,” (2) “extrajudicial statements 
. . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, 
or confessions,” or, finally,  (3) “statements that were made under circumstances which would 
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial.”15 Thus, the Confrontation Clause is aimed at statements within this “core class”16 of 
testimonial statements. 
The second proposition supported by this historical analysis was “that the Framers would 
not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial 
unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”17  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, points out that: 
The text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions 
from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts. Rather, the 
“right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” is most naturally read 
as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those 
exceptions established at the time of the founding.18  
 
Following this line of reasoning, Scalia concluded that because, under the common law in 1791, 
in order for testimony to be admissible without cross-examination the witness had to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Id. at 51-52.  
16 Id. at 51. 
17 Id. at 55-56.  
18 Id. at 54 (internal citations omitted)  
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unavailable and the defendant had to have a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, these 
requirements are incorporated into the Sixth Amendment.19 
 Thus, after Crawford, evidence is testimonial when it fits into one of the “core classes” of 
testimonial statements delineated in Crawford, and in order for testimonial evidence to comply 
with the Confrontation Clause, the declarant must be unavailable and there must have been a 
prior opportunity for the accused to cross-examine the declarant.  
C. DAVIS AND POST-CRAWFORD INTERPRETATIONS OF “TESTIMONIAL”  
Following the Supreme Court’s Decision in Crawford, courts have been left with little 
more than a non-exclusive list of examples of “testimonial” evidence.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
has been challenged with deciding several more cases involving issues which turn on the 
definition of “testimonial” evidence.  
In 2006, the Supreme Court faced such an issue in Davis v. Washington.20  This decision 
involved two consolidated cases of domestic abuse. In one case, petitioner Davis was charged 
with felony violation of a no-contact order.21  The trial court admitted a recording of the victim’s 
911 phone call and Davis was convicted.22 On appeal, the Court of Appeals and the Washington 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tape was not testimonial, and that if any portions of the 
tape were testimonial, admitting those portions was harmless error.23  In the second case, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Id.  
20 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  
21 Id. at 818.  
22 Id. at 819.  
23 Id.  
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police responded to a domestic disturbance call at the Hammon home.24  Amy Hammon was 
sitting on the front porch and appeared to be somewhat frightened, but nonetheless insisted that 
nothing was wrong.25 Hershel Hammon told police that there was an argument, but that 
everything was fine.26  Amy filled out and signed an affidavit, which was admitted at Hershel’s 
trial, where he was convicted of domestic violence and violation of probation.27  The Indiana 
Supreme Court found that the affidavit was testimonial in nature, but that its admission was 
harmless error, largely because this was a bench trial.28  
The Supreme Court in Davis affirmed the lower courts, and again exercised judicial 
restraint, refusing to define the term testimonial in any exhaustive manner.29  The Court 
explained that, “[t]he questioning that generated the deponent's statement in Crawford – which 
was made and recorded while she was in police custody, after having been given Miranda 
warnings as a possible suspect herself – qualifies under any conceivable definition of an 
interrogation.”30   Because the statement in Crawford was so clearly testimonial nature the Court 
refused to define the term “testimonial” in that case.31 	  However, in Davis the Court was forced 
to go farther in defining “testimonial,” noting that “[t]he character of the statements in the 
present cases is not as clear, and these cases require us to determine more precisely which police 
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25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 820-21.  
28 Id. at 821. 
29 See id. at 822.  
30 Id. at 822. 
31 Id.  
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interrogations produce testimony.”32  Without defining testimonial any more precisely than 
necessary for the disposition of that case, the Court held that:  
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They 
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.33  
 
Thus, though this is a relatively narrow holding, and its focus is specifically on police 
interrogations, the Court found it particularly significant to determine whether the potential piece 
of evidence was prepared to prove past events with an expectation of future criminal prosecution.  
The Court’s holding centered mainly around the facts from the first of the consolidated cases, 
involving petitioner Davis, as it found that the statements of Hershel Hammon, “were not much 
different from the statements we found to be testimonial in Crawford.”34  In Davis, the 911 call 
was made, not for the purpose of proving “past events potentially relevant to a later criminal 
prosecution,” but for the purpose of responding to an ongoing emergency.35  The Court explained 
that in Davis, the victim “was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than 
‘describ[ing] past events[.]’”36  Additionally, the victim was facing an ongoing emergency, and 
when objectively viewed, it is clear that this call was made for the purpose of responding to and 
resolving that emergency.37  Finally, the Court noted the “striking” difference in formality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 829.  
35 Id. at 827 
36 Id. at 827 (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion).  
37 Id. at 827 
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between the statements in Crawford and Davis, stating that “Crawford was responding calmly, at 
the station house, to a series of questions, with the officer-interrogator taping and making notes 
of her answers; McCottry's frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment that 
was not tranquil, or even . . . safe.”38 
The crux of the Davis holding centered on the purpose for the making of the statements. 
A 911 call, made during an ongoing emergency, which described events as they were occurring, 
rather than describing past events, was not testimonial. However, a statement made to police that 
described past events potentially relevant to a future prosecution was held to be testimonial.  
D. MELENDEZ-DIAZ: APPLYING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TO LAB REPORTS 
In 2009, in Melendez-Diaz v. United States, the Supreme Court was faced with yet 
another Confrontation Clause issue.39  The issue in Melendez-Diaz was whether a lab report 
concluding that a substance was cocaine was “testimonial” for Confrontation Clause purposes.  
Melendez-Diaz was convicted of distribution and trafficking of cocaine.40  Several bags 
containing a white substance, which were found in the back of the police cruiser that Melendez-
Diaz was driven to the station in, were sent to the crime lab for forensic analysis.41  At trial, the 
bags containing the white substance were entered into evidence, along with three “certificates of 
analysis” which stated that the forensic analysis concluded that substance contained in the bags 
was cocaine.42  On appeal, Melendez-Diaz argued that the admission of the certificates of 
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39	  Melendez-Diaz v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009). 
40 Id. at 2531. 
41 Id. at 2530 
42 Id. at 2530-31 
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analysis, without an opportunity to cross-examine the analyst who prepared them, was a 
violation of the Confrontation Clause.43  The Massachusetts Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conviction, relying on the decision in Commonwealth v. Verde,44 “which held that the authors of 
certificates of forensic analysis are not subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.”45  
After the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied review, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.46  
The Court likened the certificates of analysis to affidavits, which Crawford plainly stated 
are within the “core class of testimonial statements,” explaining that, “[t]he documents at issue 
here, while denominated by Massachusetts law ‘certificates,’ are quite plainly affidavits.”47  In 
further demonstrating the testimonial nature of the certificates, the Court stated that “[t]he fact in 
question is that the substance found in the possession of Melendez-Diaz and his codefendants 
was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine – the precise testimony the analysts would be expected 
to provide if called at trial.”48  Also pertinent to the Court’s holding was the fact that the 
certificates “were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”49  The sole purpose of the 
certificates, as stated by the Massachusetts law under which they are prepared, “was to provide 
‘prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight’ of the analyzed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Id. at 2531 
44 Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705-706 (Mass. 2005) 
45 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2531 (citing Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 705-706).  
46 Id. at 2531. 
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). 
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substance.”50  Thus, the statute gave rise to a reasonable belief that the statement would be 
available for use as evidence at a later criminal trial.51  The Supreme Court stated that “this case 
involves little more than the application of our holding in Crawford,”52 and concluded that, 
“[t]here is little doubt that the documents at issue in this case fall within the ‘core class of 
testimonial statements’ . . . described [in Crawford].”53   
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Melendez-Diaz, rejected several arguments 
presented by the respondent.  First, he rejected the contention that the analysts who prepare the 
lab reports are not “accusatory witnesses,” and thus, are not subject to the Confrontation 
Clause.54  Scalia explained that, “[w]hile the Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant the 
right to be confronted with the witnesses ‘against him,’ the Compulsory Process Clause 
guarantees a defendant the right to call witnesses ‘in his favor.’”55  Thus, there are “two classes 
of witnesses – those against the defendant and those in his favor.”56  Scalia concluded that no 
third category of “accusatory” witnesses exists, and that the lab report analysts in this case were 
clearly witnesses against the defendant, which the defendant has the right to cross-examine.57 
Second, the Court rejected the argument that the defendant had no right to confront the 
analysts because they were not “conventional witnesses” at which the Confrontation Clause was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Id. (quoting Mass Gen Laws ch. 111, § 13).  
51 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.  
52 Id. at 2542.  
53 Id. at 2532.  
54 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2533-34.  
55 Id.  




historically aimed.58  The majority rejects this argument on three grounds.  The Court refused to 
hold that the Confrontation Clause did not apply to the analysts based on any argument that 
“conventional witness recalls events observed in the past, while an analyst's report contains near-
contemporaneous observations of the test[;]” that the analysts are not conventional witnesses 
because they did observe any crime or human action related to it; or that “their statements were 
not provided in response to interrogation.”59  
Third, the respondent argued, and the dissent agreed, that the scientific nature of the 
testimony makes it distinct from testimony which recalls past events.60  This argument is based 
on the idea that recalling past events is “prone to distortion or manipulation,” while lab analysts 
simply record scientific findings and would be unlikely to testify in court to anything different to 
the information recorded in the lab report.61  In response, the Melendez-Diaz Court stated that 
“[t]his argument is little more than an invitation to return to our overruled decision in [Roberts.]”  
The Court said that this amounted to an argument that the testimony is clearly reliable, and thus, 
reliability need not be tested through cross-examination.62 Referring to Crawford, the Court 
explained the flawed logic of this argument, stating that the Confrontation Clause “commands, 
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in 
the crucible of cross-examination.”63 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Id. at 2534.  
59 Id. at 2535.  
60 Id. at 2536. 
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62). 
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In sum, the Melendez-Diaz Court found the certificates of analysis to be testimonial 
because of they were “quite plainly affidavits.” The Court referred the list of the “core class of 
testimonial statements” created in Crawford to determine that, as affidavits, the certificates were 
testimonial.64 However, the Court also placed significant emphasis on the fact that the 
certificates were created with a reasonable belief that they could be used at a criminal trial in the 
future.65 Because neither Crawford nor Melendez-Diaz created an exhaustive definition of 
“testimonial” evidence, the key inquiry remains vague: whether the statements fit within one of 
the “core classes” of testimonial statements. 
II. 
“TESTIMONIAL” HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY SEVERAL STATES TO MEAN PREPARED UNDER 
BELIEF THAT THE STATEMENT MAY BE USED AT TRIAL 
 
Several states to decide cases involving scientific evidence under the Confrontation 
Clause have turned on whether the statement was made with the reasonable belief that it may be 
used in a future criminal trial. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Caufield, though 
decided in 2006, before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Melendez-Diaz, was faced with a very 
similar factual scenario to that in Melendez-Diaz.66  Caufield was an employee at a local pub in 
Rochester, Minnesota, who was arrested for possession of a controlled substance.67  Field tests 
conducted on the substance concluded that it was cocaine.68  Subsequently, the substance was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Id. at 2531. 
65 Id. 
66 State v. Caufield, 722 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 2006). 
67 Id. at 306. 
68 Id.  
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sent to a lab for testing, which confirmed that the substance was cocaine.69 The trial court 
admitted the lab report, despite the fact that the analyst that prepared the report was not available 
for cross-examination, and Caufield was convicted. The court in Caufield said that “the critical 
determinative factor in assessing whether a statement is testimonial is whether it was prepared 
for litigation.”70   
In State v. Kent, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, found that results 
from a blood test conducted on a defendant at the hospital after a drunk driving accident were 
testimonial because there “was no ‘ongoing emergency’” and it could not “reasonably be argued 
that the ‘primary purpose’ of the lab certificate was anything other than to prove past events, 
specifically defendant's blood alcohol concentration, relevant to his DWI prosecution.”71  Thus, 
New Jersey has held that statements that are not made during an ongoing emergency, and that 
were intended to prove past events potentially relevant to a future criminal prosecution, are 
testimonial.  
In Cuadros-Fernandez v. State, the Texas Court of Appeals found that the results of DNA 
analysis performed on a cabinet door that struck the victim’s head were testimonial in nature, 
even though the results were not offered in the form of an affidavit.72  The Cuadros-Fernandez 
court did not focus on Melendez-Diaz’s classification of the certificates in that case as affidavits, 
explaining that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 309.	  	  
71 State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626, 637 (N.J. 2007).  
72 Cuadros-Fernandez v. State, __ S.W.3d __, 2009 WL 2647890 at 9 (Tex. App. Dallas 2009).  
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The Supreme Court did not end its analysis with its observation that the 
certificates were affidavits; it also looked to the substance of the certificates to 
determine if they were “made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial” and to the use of the affidavits to determine if they were “functionally 
identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on 
direct examination.’73 
 
Thus, once again the focus of the analysis is on the circumstances surrounding the statement and 
whether those circumstances would create a reasonable belief that the statement could be used at 
a later trial.  The mere fact that the statements were not affidavits or other sworn statements did 
not render them non-testimonial.  
III.  
AUTOPSY REPORTS UNDER CRAWFORD AND MELENDEZ-DIAZ 
Before Melendez-Diaz, the consensus among courts faced with determining the 
admissibility of autopsy reports since Crawford, is that autopsy reports are not testimonial, and 
thus are admissible.74  Courts have used several different modes of reasoning in concluding that 
autopsy reports are not testimonial, however, none seem to be truly in line with the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Crawford and Melendez-Diaz.  Courts have found autopsy reports non-
testimonial based primarily on the substantive reliability of the statements, an approach 
specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Crawford.  Some courts have claimed an exception 
to the Confrontation Clause for statements that qualify as business records, and others have 
focused on the nature of the statements as factual or analytical.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Id. (quoting, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52; Davis, 547 U.S. at 830) (emphasis added).  
74	  Carolyn Zabrycki, Toward a Definition of “Testimonial”: How autopsy reports do not embody the qualities of a 
testimonial statement, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (2008).	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A. IMPROPER EXCEPTION FOR BUSINESS RECORDS  
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides for an exception to the hearsay rule for 
business records.  Under Rule 803(6), in order for a piece of evidence to qualify as a business 
record and consequently be excepted from the scope of the hearsay rule, (1) it must have been 
prepared in the normal course of business – i.e. made in the regular course of a regularly 
conducted business activity and it was the regular practice of that business to make such a 
memorandum, (2) it must have been created at or near the time of the events recorded, and (3) it 
must be based on information that is the personal knowledge of the declarant, or information that 
is the personal knowledge of an informant who was under a business duty to relay the 
information to the declarant.75  
In United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006), the Second Circuit found that 
autopsy reports where not testimonial because they fit into both the business records and the 
public records exceptions to the Federal Rules of Evidence.76  Thus, Feliz illustrates the view 
that statements that fall within these hearsay exceptions are not testimonial, as they are not 
created for trial.  Importantly, it is not because the autopsy report fit within a “firmly rooted” 
hearsay exception, but because it was found not to be testimonial, that the Confrontation Clause 
was not invoked.  This decision came three years before the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Melendez-Diaz, where Justice Scalia stated: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  See, 5 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence §803.08[1].  
76 United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 237 (2d Cir. 2006).  
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Business and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not 
because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because – having 
been created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact at trial – they are not testimonial. Whether or 
not they qualify as business or official records, the analysts' statements here – 
prepared specifically for use at petitioner's trial – were testimony against 
petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment. 
 
If an autopsy report was prepared for litigation, it will likely be inadmissible under Rule 
803(6)’s business records exception anyway.77  However, this analysis begs the question, what if 
the certificates were not prepared specifically and solely for use at trial?  If an autopsy report was 
conducted in the routine course of business, and later investigation uncovered criminal activity 
surrounding the death, would the report be admissible as a business record?  In order for the 
Supreme Court’s departure from Roberts to have any significance, the answer must depend on 
the circumstances surrounding the statement, and whether there was an objectively reasonable 
belief that the statement would be available for use at trial.  To admit statements based on their 
classification within hearsay exceptions alone, without acknowledging that a reasonable belief 
that they may be used at a later trial would make them testimonial, would be nothing more than a 
return to the overruled Roberts test.   
A. IMPROPER FACT/OPINION DISTINCTION 
In a post-Crawford, but pre-Davis and Melendez-Diaz decision, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals, in Rollins v. State, found an autopsy report to be non-testimonial.78  The Rollins court 
held that the statements in the autopsy report were routine and descriptive, and “were non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  See, 5 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence §803.08[6][d] (“Material prepared for litigation poses special problems under 
the rule and is typically inadmissible, either as having not been prepared in the regular course of business or as 
having indications of lack of trustworthiness.”).	  
78 Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821(Md. 2006).  
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analytical findings that we do not view to be part of the core class of testimonial statements that 
the Confrontation Clause is intended to prevent.”79 One reason for the court’s holding was that 
the autopsy report in that case had been redacted to exclude all testimonial statements, according 
to the Maryland court’s understanding of that term, by excluding all opinions and references to 
cause or manner of death.80  The Rollins court went on to say that: “Where, however, contested 
conclusions or opinions in an autopsy report are central to the determination of corpus delecti or 
criminal agency and are offered into evidence, they serve the same function as testimony and 
trigger the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.”81   
The court purported to determine whether autopsy reports may be testimonial by 
determining, under Crawford, whether they fell into the category of “statements that were made 
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”82  However, the court quickly turned its 
focus to whether or not the reports were conducted for the “sole purpose” of being used at trial, 
and concluded that because such reports are not always used at trial, the proper inquiry is 
whether the individual statements within the report are testimonial in nature.83  In determining 
whether the statements within the report were testimonial, the court focused on whether the 
statements were opinions or observations, ignoring the Crawford analysis that the court 
acknowledged as the proper analysis in this case – whether the statements “were made under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Id. at 839-40.	  	  
80 Id. 824.  
81 Id. at 841.  
82 Crawford, 451 U.S. at 52.  
83 Rollins, 897 A.2d at 840-41 (Md. 2006). 
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circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial.”   
The origin of this observation versus opinion analysis is unknown, and in reviewing this 
decision, scholars have noted that there is no basis in any of the Supreme Court’s earlier 
decisions for the distinction expressed in Rollins which differentiates objective and opinion 
statements.84 Additionally, such a distinction would be quite difficult to apply in practice. In 
Rollins, statements that the eyes were “cloudy” and statements which used other descriptive 
terms such as “acute” and “chronic” were classified as factual findings, thus non-testimonial and 
admissible.  However, these sorts of observational statements are certainly capable of being 
classified as opinions, and thus testimonial statements, making the application of this standard 
highly impractical.85  
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, an analysis based on the nature of the 
statement as factual or analytical is patently inconsistent with the purpose-driven analysis of 
Crawford.  In Crawford, Sylvia Crawford’s statement made to police that she did not see a 
weapon in Michael Crawford’s hand was found to be testimonial, as it was made under 
circumstances that would lead Sylvia to believe that it would be used at trial; however, this 
statement was a factual statement, that under the analysis proposed by the Rollins court and other 
courts that make a factual/analytical distinction, would be non-testimonial.86  Thus, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 See Steven N. Yermish, Melendez-Diaz and the Application of Crawford in the Lab, 33 Champion 28, 31 (2009) 
(“There is little basis for the distinction expressed in Rollins and similar cases.”); Cyrus P.W. Rieck, How to Deal 
With Laboratory Reports Under Crawford v. Washington: A Question With No Good Answer, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
839, 863 (2008) (“there is no basis in Crawford or Davis for differentiating between “objective” and “opinion” 
statements.”). 
85 See Zabrycki, 96 CAL. L. REV. at 1110. 
86 Id. at 1110. 
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fact/opinion distinction is simply irreconcilable with the seminal Supreme Court decision which 
established “testimonial” evidence as the standard for Confrontation Clause analysis.  
B. POST MELENDEZ-DIAZ TREATMENT OF AUTOPSY REPORTS.  
Since Melendez-Diaz, many courts have found autopsy reports, under the circumstances 
of those particular cases, to be testimonial.  These courts have undoubtedly applied the 
testimonial/non-testimonial distinction in a manner far more reconcilable with the decisions in 
Crawford and Melendez-Diaz.  
In the 2009 case, People v. Dungo, the California Court of Appeals found that an autopsy 
report, under the circumstances of that case, was testimonial.87  The court highlighted that the 
report was made amidst a homicide investigation, that the findings were statutorily required to be 
reduced to writing or preserved, and that the coroner was statutorily required to report to the 
appropriate law enforcement agency in the event that criminal activity was suspected.88 This 
statutory obligation, along with the circumstances surrounding the reports preparation, certainly 
appears to give rise to a reasonable belief that the report would be available for use at a later trial.  
While an appeal is pending in this case, the crux of the appeal appears to involve whether the 
testimony of another expert, based on the findings of an autopsy report performed by an 
unavailable medical examiner, violates the Confrontation Clause, and not whether the autopsy 
report itself is testimonial.89 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 People v. Dungo, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), review granted, 220 P.3d 240 (Cal. 2009).  
88 Id. at 710.	  	  
89 “The parties will brief and argue the following issues: (1) Was defendant denied his right of confrontation under 
the Sixth Amendment when one forensic pathologist testified to the manner and cause of death in a murder case 
based upon an autopsy report prepared by another pathologist? (2) How does the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314, affect 
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In State v. Locklear, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that “when the State seeks 
to introduce forensic analyses, ‘[a]bsent a showing that the analysts [are] unavailable to testify at 
trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them’ such evidence is 
inadmissible under Crawford.”90  While, the Locklear court found that the admission of the 
autopsy report was harmless error, the court stated that “the admission of such evidence violated 
defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, and the trial court therefore 
erred in overruling defendant's objections.”91 
In Wood v. State, while holding that the autopsy report was testimonial, the Texas Court 
of Appeals qualified it’s holding, stating that: 
We do not hold that all autopsy reports are categorically testimonial. In this case, 
however, the circumstances surrounding Wessberg's death warranted the police in 
the suspicion that his death was a homicide, and there is evidence that this is 
exactly what the police did suspect. The homicide detective who was the lead 
investigator in this case and a police evidence specialist attended the autopsy of 
Wessberg's body. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that 
Colemeyer understood that the report containing her findings and opinions would 
be used prosecutorially.92 
 
Thus, the court applied Crawford and Melendez-Diaz and inquired whether the examiner 
that performed the autopsy did so “under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,”93 and found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
this court's decision in People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104?” Order Granting 
Petition for Review, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 282 (Cal. 2009).  
90 People v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 283, 305 (N.C. 2009). 
91 Id.  
92 Wood v. State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 209-10 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). 	  
93 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2529 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).  
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that, “[u]nder these circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that [the medical examiner] 
understood that the report containing her findings and opinions would be used prosecutorially.”94 
III. 
HOW SHOULD CRAWFORD BE APPLIED TO AUTOPSY REPORTS? 
The open-ended definitions of “testimonial” offered by the Supreme Court in Crawford, 
Davis, and Melendez-Diaz, coupled with the inconsistent application of this rule by the states, 
makes it seemingly unavoidable that this definition will be revisited in future cases. Autopsy 
reports are often the most critical pieces of evidence in criminal trials involving the death of an 
individual.  The question of whether findings and conclusions in autopsy reports should be 
considered testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes is one that has not yet been addressed 
by the Supreme Court.  The following outlines how the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
should evolve in the context of autopsy reports.  
A. A STRICT APPLICATION OF CRAWFORD’S “CORE CLASS” ANALYSIS WILL RESULT IN A 
CONCLUSION THAT MOST AUTOPSY REPORTS ARE TESTIMONIAL 
 
  In Crawford, the Court provided a list of “core classes” of testimonial statements, all of 
which seemed to be formal documents prepared to function in much the same way as live in-
court testimony, or statements made under circumstances that would give rise to an objectively 
reasonable belief that the statement may be used in a future trial.95  In Melendez-Diaz, the Court 
relied on both the formal nature of the certificates of analysis, and the fact that they were 
prepared under an objectively reasonable belief that they could be used at a later criminal trial.96 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Wood, 299 S.W.3d at 210.  
95 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
96 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2531.  
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Thus, the important criteria, although significantly intertwined, appear to be whether the 
statements are formalized in nature, whether they are prepared under a reasonable belief that they 
could be used at a later criminal trial, and whether they would operate as the functional 
equivalent of live in-court testimony.  
Crawford stated, and Melendez-Diaz reiterated, that testimonial statements include 
“statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials.”97  In describing what it meant by 
formalized testimonial materials, the Court listed several examples: “affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions”98  In finding the certificates of analysis in Melendez-Diaz testimonial, 
the Court gave credence to the fact that the certificates were signed and notarized, and that“[t]he 
‘certificates’ are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing “precisely what a 
witness does on direct examination.”99 The Court concluded that the certificates were “quite 
plainly affidavits: ‘declaration[s] of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an 
officer authorized to administer oaths.’”100  
Just like the certificates in Melendez-Diaz, autopsy reports may fairly be characterized as 
“solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.”101 While autopsy reports may not be required to be notarized as the certificates in 
Melendez-Diaz were, they are generally required to bear the signature of the medical examiner 
that performed the autopsy.  Autopsy reports are conducted by medical examiners for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52). 
98 Id.  
99 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 830).  
100 Id. at 2532 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed.2004)).  
101 Id. at 2531 (quoting Crawford, 541 at 51).  
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specific purpose of determining the cause of death, and thus, contain the precise testimony that 
would be given at trial on direct examination, and appear to be testimonial in nature.102  
The Melendez-Diaz Court relied on the list of testimonial statements provided by 
Crawford, which referred to affidavits twice, concluding that because the “certificates” were 
affidavits, they were within the “core class of testimonial statements.”  However, the fact that 
autopsy reports may not be “sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer 
oaths,”103 does not render them non-testimonial as a matter of law.  In Davis, the statements 
made to police were found to be testimonial despite the fact that they were not sworn statements.  
Thus, the sworn nature of the statements in Melendez-Diaz was a factor weighing in favor of 
their classification as testimonial, rather than an all or nothing requirement.  
One common thread among Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz, is that each decision 
acknowledged that statements are testimonial when made with a reasonable belief that the 
statements could be used as evidence in a future criminal trial.104  The Melendez-Diaz Court 
found it particularly important that the certificates of analysis in that case were prepared under a 
reasonable belief that they could be used in a future criminal trial.105 While the relevant statute in 
that case specifically stated that “the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide ‘prima facie 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See id. at 2532.  
103 Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed.2004)).  
104 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (“not only were the affidavits ‘made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial, but under 
Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide prima facie evidence of the composition, 
quality, and the net weight of the analyzed substance.” (internal citations omitted)); Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 
(“[statements] are testimonial when . . . the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (explaining that testimonial statements 
include, “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”).  
105 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532.  
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evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight’ of the analyzed substance,”106 this did 
not create a requirement that the “sole purpose” of the statement must be the provision of 
evidence for trial.  That a statement is created for the sole purpose of trial is a sufficient, but not a 
necessary condition for admissibility.  The standard from Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz, 
remains that there must have been a reasonable belief that the statement would be available for 
use at a later trial.  
The nature of a medical examiner’s work should give rise to an objectively reasonable 
belief that autopsy reports may be available for use at a later trial.  Medical examiners perform 
autopsy reports for one reason, to establish or prove past events – i.e. to determine the cause of 
death.  Because autopsy reports have consistently been used in criminal prosecutions involving 
homicide, a reasonable medical examiner would know that his or her autopsy report may be used 
in a later criminal prosecution.  In fact, many state statutes call for reporting to the appropriate 
law enforcement agency when it becomes apparent to the medical examiner that criminal activity 
may have been involved in an individual’s death. For instance in Alaska, the statute states in 
pertinent part: “If the findings and conclusions indicate that the death may have been caused by 
criminal means, the state medical examiner or the deputy medical examiner shall submit a copy 
of the report to the district attorney responsible for prosecutions in the location where the death 
occurred.”107  Certainly under these circumstances, it should be even clearer to a medical 
examiner that his or her report may be available for use in a later trial.  
Even in instances when a medical examiner finds no possibility of criminal activity, he or 
she may be required to turn the autopsy report over to law enforcement.  Under certain statutes, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Id. (quoting Mass Gen Laws ch. 111, § 13). 
107	  ALASKA STAT. § 12.65.020 (2010).	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medical examiner’s conclusion that the cause of death was natural would not extinguish the 
objectively reasonable belief that the autopsy report may be used at some later trial.  Regardless 
of a medical examiner’s conclusions regarding cause of death, state laws often impose on 
medical examiners a duty to furnish an autopsy report to the appropriate government authority 
upon request.108 For example, subsection F. of the Arizona statute states that, “[a] county 
attorney may request and upon request shall receive from the county medical examiner or 
alternate medical examiner a copy of the report on any autopsy performed.”  Thus, under such a 
statutory scheme it can be argued that a medical examiner is on constant notice that his or her 
report may be used in a later criminal trial.  
Additionally, an autopsy report is the functional equivalent of the live in court testimony 
that the examiner would provide.  In homicide cases, evidence regarding the cause of death is 
imperative.  In cases where a medical examiner is unavailable, the autopsy report would be 
admitted for the purpose of establishing exactly what the medical examiner would attempt to 
establish on direct examination, the cause of death.  Thus, autopsy reports, like the certificates of 
analysis in Melendez-Diaz, are “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing 
‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’”109  Thus it appears that an autopsy report, 
under the analysis set forth in Crawford, would generally qualify as testimonial statements.  
B. MAY ANOTHER EXPERT TESTIFY BASED ON AN AUTOPSY REPORT PREPARED BY AN 
UNAVAILABLE MEDICAL EXAMINER WITHOUT VIOLATING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE?  
 
A conclusion that autopsy reports are testimonial could prove to be a giant hurdle in the 
prosecution of “cold case” murders, and other prosecutions in which the medical examiner who 
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  See; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-597 (2010); CAL GOV’T CODE § 27491.1 (West 2010);  
109 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532.	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prepared the autopsy report is not available for cross-examination.  Prosecutors could be left 
unable to use the most critical piece of evidence in many cases.  In this situation, prosecutors 
may chose to call another expert to testify based on the autopsy report, without admitting the 
report itself as evidence, or calling the medical examiner who prepared the report to testify. This 
approach to using autopsy reports raises another pivotal issue: If the autopsy report is 
testimonial, and thus inadmissible without the opportunity to cross-examine the preparing 
medical examiner, should another expert be allowed to testify using his own opinion based on 
factual findings in the report? 
1. People v. Dungo 
This very issue is awaiting review at the California Supreme Court at this time.  In 
People v. Dungo, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder for strangling his wife to 
death.110  The defendant admitted that he choked his wife, but only after he was provoked to the 
point of losing all control, and thus, he should be guilty of voluntary manslaughter at the most.111 
A very critical fact in contention was the duration of the choking, which tended to show whether 
defendant was guilty of murder or manslaughter.112  The autopsy report was not admitted to 
evidence, and another expert, Dr. Lawrence, who was the supervisor of Dr. Bolduc, the examiner 
that prepared the report, testified regarding cause of death and the duration of choking.113  This 
case is relatively unique because, rather than dealing with an unavailable medical examiner, this 
case dealt with a prosecutor’s choice to use the testimony of Dr. Lawrence, rather than that of Dr. 
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Bolduc, because of Dr. Bolduc’s less than perfect professional history.  “Dr. Bolduc had been 
fired from Kern County and had been allowed to resign ‘under a cloud’ from Orange County and 
that both Stanislaus and San Joaquin Counties refused to use him to testify in homicide cases.”114 
At trial, the court found that because the report itself wasn’t introduced, the Crawford 
analysis wasn’t invoked, and that allowing Dr. Lawrence to testify based on Dr. Bolduc’s report 
did not present a Sixth Amendment issue because “experts can rely on hearsay to help form their 
opinions and it doesn't call into effect the Crawford issue because that's not being used for the 
truth of the matter, that's just what he based his opinion on.”	  	   
The appellate court held that the autopsy report was testimonial, as it was prepared 
amidst a homicide investigation, and that Dr. Bolduc was a “witness” for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment.115  The court went on to conclude that allowing Dr. Lawrence to testify based on 
Dr. Bolduc’s autopsy report violated the defendant’s right of confrontation because there was no 
showing that Dr. Bolduc, who prepared the autopsy report, was unavailable, or that there was a 
prior opportunity for defendant to cross-examine him.116  The Court of Appeals recognized that 
“this case illustrates the inadequacies of substitute cross-examination[,]” explaining that “[w]hile 
Dr. Lawrence generally was aware of Dr. Bolduc's work history, Dr. Lawrence was unable to 
respond to specific questions concerning Dr. Bolduc's alleged incompetence in prior cases.”117   
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On appeal, the petitioner will rely on the 2007 case, People v. Beeler.118  In this case, Dr. 
Fukumoto testified “regarding the autopsy procedures of the office and further testified that 
standard operating procedures were followed in the Stevenson autopsy and in the documentation 
of the autopsy.”119  Although the examiner that prepared the report, Dr. Bolduc (the same Dr. 
Bolduc), was not made available for cross-examination, the report in Beeler was admitted based 
on its classification as a business record.120  The petitioner also contends that based on People v. 
Greier, an expert may testify based upon a report that he or she did not prepare.121 
The respondent will argue that “[t]o the extent that the appellate court's holding is 
inconsistent with this Court's precedent, that result was dictated by the holding and reasoning of 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz.”122  The respondent contends that 
Melendez-Diaz made it extremely clear that a statement’s qualification as a business record does 
not affect the Confrontation Clause analysis, and that it is the objectively reasonable belief that 
the statement may be used at trial that is dispositive.123  Attacking the petitioner’s reliance on 
Grier, the respondent points out that “the ruling in Geier rested on this Court's conclusion that 
the laboratory report at issue was not testimonial hearsay, a conclusion that cannot be sustained 
in light of the decision in Melendez-Diaz.”124 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Petition for Review at 5, People v. Dungo, 220 P.3d 240 (October 2, 2009).  
119People v. Beeler, 891 P.2d 153, 168 (Cal. 1995). 
120 Id. at 167. 
121 Petition for Review at 6.  
122 Answer to Petition for Review at 1-2, People v. Dungo, 220 P.3d 240 (October 23, 2009). 
123 Id. at 4.  
124 Id. at 5 (internal citations omitted).  
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2. Wood v. State 
In Wood v. State, the defendant was convicted of the murder of George Wessberg.125 The 
medical examiner that prepared the autopsy report was not called to testify at trial, [i]nstead, the 
State called the chief medical examiner, Dr. David Dolinak, who had not been present at the 
autopsy, to testify regarding the examination of the body and to give his opinions regarding 
Wessberg's injuries and the cause of his death.”126  Over the defense counsel’s objections, Dr. 
Dolinak was permitted to testify to his own opinions, based on his review of the autopsy report, 
and the defendant was convicted.  
On appeal, the appellant argued that this violated the defendant’s right to cross 
examination under the Confrontation Clause.127  Unconvinced by the appellee’s reliance on pre-
Melendez-Diaz cases, the court held that the autopsy report in this case was testimonial.128 
However, the court noted that, “this does not resolve the issue because the autopsy report was not 
introduced in evidence.”129  Thus, the court determined whether Dr. Dolinak’s opinions based on 
the testimonial autopsy report violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, concluding that 
Dolinak’s opinion testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause: 
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  Wood, 299 S.W.3d at 202.	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129 Id. at 210.  
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When an expert bases an opinion on testimonial hearsay but does not disclose the 
testimonial hearsay on which that opinion is based, the jury hears only the expert's 
direct, in-court testimony. We hold that the Confrontation Clause was not 
offended when Dolinak testified to his own opinions regarding the nature and 
causes of Wessberg's injuries and death, even though those opinions were based 
in part on Dolinak's review of Colemeyer's autopsy report.130 
 
However, Dolinak did not simply testify to his own opinions based on testimonial 
material, he also disclosed to the jury those testimonial statements on which his opinions were 
based.131  The court explained that Rule 705(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows an 
expert to disclose to the jury facts and data underlying their opinion, but only when their value 
for explaining and supporting the expert’s position is not outweighed by the danger that they will 
be used for another purpose, for which they would be inadmissible.132 The court explained that 
“[o]ne of the greatest dangers in allowing otherwise inadmissible evidence under Rule 705 is that 
the jury will consider the facts and data as substantive evidence rather than as merely 
constituting the underlying basis for the expert's opinion.”133  Because the court found that the 
jury could not consider the testimonial statements in the autopsy report as supporting or 
explaining Dolinak's opinions, without assuming that the statements were true[,]” this constituted 
a violation of the Confrontation Clause.134	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3. Why an expert should not be permitted to testify based on findings within a 
testimonial autopsy report.  
 
The California Court of Appeals correctly explained in Dungo, that allowing “substitute 
cross-examination” is simply inadequate.135  For example, as was the case in Dungo, the expert 
may not be capable of giving any meaningful answers to questions regarding the personal and 
professional to the medical examiner.  As the Court cautioned in Melendez-Diaz, “Confrontation 
is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well.”136  To 
allow this “substitute cross-examination” would undercut the defendant’s ability to use his right 
to confront for the very purpose for which it was designed.  
Finding an autopsy report testimonial, and subsequently allowing testimony from another 
expert based on the autopsy report would simply be an unconstitutional undermining of the 
Confrontation Clause.  If the autopsy report is testimonial, the medical examiner who prepared it 
and made the statements within it is a witness against the defendant for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court made it quite clear in Melendez-Diaz that the Confrontation 
Clause will not give way to prosecutorial convenience.137  To allow another expert to testify 
based upon the contents of a testimonial autopsy report would be to find that the cross-
examination of the medical examiner that prepared the report is a fundamental constitutional 
right of the defendant, provided by the Sixth Amendment, but that allowing the defendant to 
cross-examine someone else is good enough, in light of inconveniences to the prosecution.  
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  Dungo, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d at 705.	  
136 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 
137 Id. at 2540 (“The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is 
equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause-like 
those other constitutional provisions-is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.”) 
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C. ARE NOTICE AND DEMAND STATUTES AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PROBLEM? 
 
Many states use procedural devices called “notice and demand” statutes in order to 
alleviate some of the burden placed on prosecutors by the defendant’s right to confront in the 
context of admitting forensic reports.  These statues fall into four basic categories, (1) basic 
notice and demand, (2) notice and demand plus, (3) anticipatory demand, and (4) defense 
subpoena.138  Basic notice and demand statutes require that the prosecution notify the defendant 
of its intention to use a lab report (or in this context an autopsy report), and the defendant then 
must follow a simple procedure to avail himself of the right to cross examine the analyst (or 
medical examiner).139  Under notice and demand plus statutes, the defendant must give 
substantive reasons justifying his demand.140  Anticipatory demand (“AD”) statutes do not 
require the prosecution to notify the defendant of any intention to use a particular report at trial; 
however, the burden remains on the defendant to demand cross-examination.141  Certain AD 
statutes also require the defendant to provide substantive reasons for the demand.142  Finally, 
under defense subpoena statues, there is no notice requirement, and the burden is on the 
defendant, not merely to demand the presence of the individual that prepared the report, but to 
subpoena that individual to appear.143 Some such statutes contain provisions which allow the 
defendant to subpoena the individual that prepared the report to testify for the prosecution, but 
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absent such a provision, the defendant must subpoena that individual to testify during the 
defendant’s own case.144  Additionally, defense subpoena statutes typically require the defendant 
to provide substantive reasons for cross-examination.145  
These statutes are criticized as unconstitutional because, under certain circumstances, it is 
argued that they impose too great of a burden on the defendant’s right to confront, and do not 
provide adequate information to secure a knowing and voluntary waiver of this constitutional 
right.146  Naturally, this concern is greater with statutes, such as AD statutes and defense 
subpoena statues, which do not require the prosecution to give notice to the defendant, and thus, 
place a greater burden on defendants wishing to exercise their right to confront.  
However, this does not necessarily mean that all notice and demand statutes should be 
unconstitutional violations of the Confrontation Clause.  The Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz, 
albeit in dicta, hinted to the fact that certain notice and demand statutes may be constitutional:  
In their simplest form, notice-and-demand statutes require the prosecution to 
provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst's report as evidence 
at trial, after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object 
to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst's appearance live at trial. 
Contrary to the dissent's perception, these statutes shift no burden whatever. The 
defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection; 
notice-and-demand statutes simply govern the time within which he must do so. 
States are free to adopt procedural rules governing objections. It is common to 
require a defendant to exercise his rights under the Compulsory Process Clause in 
advance of trial, announcing his intent to present certain witnesses. There is no 
conceivable reason why he cannot similarly be compelled to exercise his 
Confrontation Clause rights before trial.147 
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Thus, the Court indicates that simple notice and demand statutes may be constitutionally 
permissible.  In her article entitled: Between Substance and Procedure: A role for states’ 
interests in the scope of the Confrontation Clause, Jenifer B. Sokoler agrees, arguing that the use 
of proper notice and demand statutes would be “consistent with the Supreme Court precedent in 
other areas of constitutional criminal procedure where the Court has upheld state-imposed rules 
governing the implementation of a constitutional right.”148  Specifically, Sokoler compares 
notice and demand statutes to a trial court’s preclusion of a defense witness as a sanction for 
failure to comply with state discovery procedures, which has been upheld despite the right to call 
witnesses under the Compulsory Process Clause.149  Additionally, the Supreme Court upheld a 
criminal procedure rule in Florida, challenged under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
which required the defendant to notify the prosecution of his intent to use an alibi defense at 
trial.150  These cases illustrate the Court’s willingness to take into account the burdens placed on 
the prosecution, and allow for states to create procedural mechanisms for defendants to follow in 
order to exercise constitutional certain rights.  
However, the question remains, what sort of notice and demand statutes are permissible?  
Shortly after its decision in Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Briscoe v. 
Virginia, where the issue was:  
“If a state allows a prosecutor to introduce a certificate of a forensic laboratory 
analysis, without presenting the testimony of the analyst who prepared the 
certificate, does the state avoid violating the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
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149 See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).  
150 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).  
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Amendment by providing that the accused has a right to call the analyst as his 
own witness?”151 
 
The petitioner argued that this issue had been directly addressed in Melendez-Diaz: “had the 
Court accepted the contention by Massachusetts that the ability to subpoena the analysts was a 
full substitute for the right to be confronted with them, presumably the Court would have 
affirmed rather than reversed the decision of the Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirming the 
conviction.”152  After the issues were fully briefed and oral argument was held, the Supreme 
Court vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for consideration under the 
recent decision in Melendez-Diaz.153 The Virginia statute was a defense subpoena statute, which 
placed the burden of calling the witness on the defendant.  Such a statute is likely to be found 
unconstitutional as it converts the defendant’s right to “be confronted” into a right to 
affirmatively call the witness.   
In her article, Sokoler sets forth a “constitutional ceiling,” consisting of three conditions 
that must be met for a notice and demand statute to be constitutional:  
(1) the defendant must be provided with notice of the contents of the report, the 
conditions under which it was prepared, the consequences of failure to demand 
his right to confrontation, and the procedure through which he can make this 
demand; (2) the defendant cannot be obligated to request a subpoena in order to 
exercise his right to confrontation, he cannot be required to provide a substantive 
basis for his demand, and he must be afforded reasonable time to make this 
demand; and (3) failure to demand cannot result in forfeiture of the right to 
confrontation if the defendant can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he did not understand the procedure to exercise his right or that 
after the time for his demand had expired, he came across new information that 
caused him to exercise his right.154 
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Sokoler explains that each of the three requirements is significant to ensure the constitutionality 
of the statutes.   
The notice requirement assures that defendant’s are aware that the “default rule” that the 
witness will appear in person is “turned off,” provides the defendant with adequate information 
to determine whether the right to confrontation should be exercised or waived, and assures that 
the defendant understands how to exercise his right to cross-examination.   
The demand requirement assures that the statute does not shift the burden to the 
defendant to actually subpoena the witness.155  Unlike simple notice and demand statutes, 
defense subpoena statutes actually shift the burden to defendants to secure the presence of the 
witness.  Basic notice and demand statutes simply require the defendant to invoke his 
confrontation right at an earlier time, as Justice Scalia stated in Melendez-Diaz, “[t]he defendant 
always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection; notice-and-demand statutes 
simply govern the time within which he must do so.”156  Additionally, under this requirement, a 
defendant cannot be forced to show substantive reasons for invoking the confrontation right.157  
This protects against a retreat to the overruled Roberts analysis, because if a defendant were 
required to show substantive reasons for cross-examination, this would arguably be another form 
admissibility based on the reliability of the testimony. 
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Finally, the third requirement provides a residual exception for specific circumstances in 
which a particular defendant is simply unable to comply with the requirements of the statute.158  
The purpose of this requirement is to alleviate the concern that permitting any notice and demand 
statutes whatsoever would result in inadequate protection of defendants in situations where they 
are unaware or unable to meet the statute’s requirements.159   
This framework set forth by Sokoler would be appropriate for use in the context of 
autopsy reports, as it would adequately protect the interests of criminal defendants, while taking 
into account the state’s practical concerns in making medical examiners testify in every case.   
Importantly, these requirements would not impose a large burden on defendants who wish to 
cross-examine medical examiners, but strike a proper balance between the practical difficulties 
inherent in making medical examiners available at every trial in which their reports are used, and 
the defendant’s right to confront those individuals at trial if he so desires.   
D. SHOULD THE COURT RE-DEFINE TESTIMONIAL? 
Scholars have argued that the current standard for determining whether or not a statement 
is testimonial is simply too vague and would apply to statements, such as autopsy reports, that 
the Confrontation Clause was not originally intended to apply to.  In her article, entitled Toward 
a Definition of “Testimonial”: How autopsy reports do not embody the qualities of a testimonial 
statement, Carolyn Zabrycki proposes a new definition for testimonial, which she claims will 
properly reflect the original purpose for the Confrontation Clause: “out-of-court statements are 
testimonial and thus require confrontation if they are produced by, or with the involvement of, 
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adversarial government officials responsible for investigating and prosecuting crime.”160  
Zabrycki argues that such a definition would sufficiently combat the historical evils at which the 
Confrontation Clause was aimed, as all of the historical cases discussed in Crawford were 
concerned primarily with the prosecutorial and investigative role of the individuals conducting 
the interrogation.161  
This definition could be interpreted to make all autopsy reports non-testimonial, as was 
clearly intended by Zabrycki.  Medical examiners are government officials, but Zabrycki argues 
that because they are not primarily concerned with investigation, they are not “adversary 
government officials.”162 Additionally, because the report is only submitted to the police in 
certain circumstances, and not created with the involvement of police, it is argued that autopsy 
reports are not created with the involvement of, adversarial government officials.   
This article was published the year before the Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz, 
and the decision in Melendez-Diaz appears to be reconcilable with this “adversary government 
officials” line of reasoning, at least to some extent.  The certificates of analysis in that case were 
created at the request of law enforcement and under Massachusetts law, their sole purpose was 
for use as evidence at trial.163 Thus, it appears clearly that the statements in that case were made 
with the involvement of adversarial government officials responsible for investigating and 
prosecuting crime, as required by Zarbycki’s proposed definition.  
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In applying her definition to autopsy reports, Zabrycki argues that medical examiners are 
not “adversary” government officials, and thus, their autopsy reports are not testimonial.164  
However, by the language of the definition Zabrycki would have the Court adopt, it appears that 
autopsy reports could potentially be classified as testimonial statements.  There is no doubt that 
police officers are adversary government officials responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
crime under this analysis, and the definition makes any statements testimonial that are made 
“with the involvement of” such officials.  Thus, this definition would not require that the medical 
examiners themselves be adversary government officials, but that they prepare the report with 
the involvement of adversary government officials.  When the medical examiner concludes that 
the death was the result of homicide and submits the report to the police for investigation, the 
statement is arguably made with the involvement of adversary government officials, and thus, is 
testimonial.   
While this definition may still render some autopsy reports testimonial, autopsy reports 
that indicate natural death and are only used in a later “cold case” criminal prosecution would 
likely be non-testimonial and admissible under this definition.  This would at least alleviate 
concerns that cold cases would be near impossible to prosecute because examiners who prepared 
reports many years ago are likely to be unavailable and their reports inadmissible.   
Ultimately, though this definition is intended to make autopsy reports non-testimonial 
and admissible, it would still depend on the courts’ interpretations of “involvement of adversary 
government officials,” which could be interpreted in a way that would still classify many autopsy 
reports as testimonial.  This definition would certainly narrow the scope of testimonial 
statements to exclude statements that would have been testimonial under Crawford’s definition 
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of “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”165  If the 
definition of testimonial is to be changed, it should be changed with an eye toward uniform 
application and predictability.  The definition proposed by Zabrycki, though arguably more 
concrete and predictable than the current standard, is still open to significant interpretation and 
manipulation.  
CONCLUSION 
 While re-defining “testimonial” may aid the prosecution in admitting certain forensic 
reports without cross-examination of the preparing analyst, the Supreme Court is not likely to 
contradict the seminal decisions it has rendered in the past six years based merely on concerns 
regarding prosecutorial efficiency.  How the Supreme Court will apply the Crawford/Melendez-
Diaz line of cases to autopsy reports is likely to be a factual question, which will depend on 
whether a given report falls within one of the “core classes” of testimonial statements.  If autopsy 
reports cannot be classified as sworn statements or statements akin to affidavits, such as the lab 
reports in Melendez-Diaz, the issue will likely turn on whether there is or should be an 
objectively reasonable belief in the preparing medical examiner that the autopsy report will be 
available for use in a future criminal trial. Autopsy reports created as part of a criminal 
investigation should clearly be included as “statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.”166  In cases where the autopsy reports are not prepared amidst a 
criminal investigation, statutory provisions which require reporting to governmental authorities 
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and factual circumstances surrounding the preparation of the autopsy report will play a major 
role in the Court’s determination of whether an autopsy report should be considered testimonial 
and invoke the Confrontation Clause.   
 The approach of allowing another expert to testify based upon the findings in an autopsy 
report hardly solves the Confrontation Clause problem.  Rather than using non-testimonial 
evidence, or making the individual who created the report available for cross examination, this 
approach simply takes a testimonial statement, and places in the mouth of another witness, who 
is available to be cross-examined.  It is the individual that prepared the autopsy report who 
“bears testimony” against the defendant, and thus, is a witness for Confrontation Clause 
purposes.  Under Crawford, unless that witness can show that he or she is unavailable and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross examine the witness, the statement is inadmissible.  
Procedural devices such as notice and demand statutes are conceivably constitutional, and 
would likely strike an appropriate balance between the practical difficulties inherent in making 
every individual that prepares an autopsy report testify at trial, and the defendant’s right to have 
that individual testify and be subjected to cross examination if he so chooses.  It is necessary, 
however, to ensure that these statutes do not amount to defense subpoena statutes, or statutes 
which would otherwise impose too great a burden on defendant’s wishing to exercise their Sixth 
Amendment rights.  The three requirements expounded upon in Sokoler’s article, and discussed 
supra, would provide an adequate safeguard for the defendant, while remaining receptive to the 
practical concerns of prosecutors and medical examiners. 
 
 
